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ANTHONY V. CITY OF NEW YORK
(decided August 8, 2003)
ROY G. LOCKE, JR.*
Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion, a person should expect to rest in the sanctity of her home
without unreasonable government intrusion.1  However, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Anthony v. City of New
York,2 recently stripped away some of the very protections guaran-
teed by the Fourth Amendment by granting qualified immunity
against liability to two police officers.  Without deciding whether or
not probable cause existed, the court held it was reasonable for two
police officers to forcibly remove a 34-year old female immigrant,
diagnosed with Down Syndrome, from her apartment, for psychiat-
ric evaluation.3  While the court properly applied the law pertain-
ing to qualified immunity, the grant of immunity in this case
unnecessarily broadened the power of the police to remove a per-
son from her home with only the slightest indicia of abnormality.
This holding could have far-reaching negative effects on the men-
tally facile, or even some elderly citizens, who could also be forcibly
removed from their homes, despite their Fourth Amendment pro-
tection against unreasonable seizures.
In Anthony v. City of New York, two police officers, Gerald Mig-
liaro (“Migliaro”) and Richard Collegio (“Collegio”), arrived at the
apartment of Myra Anthony (“Anthony”) in response to a request
for back-up to a 911 call.4  The 911 call was from a female caller
* J.D. candidate New York Law School, 2005.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches or seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon PROBABLE CAUSE, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” (emphasis added).  The issue for discussion here involves the un-
reasonable seizure of a person by police officers.
2. Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2003).
3. Id. at 138.
4. ,Id. at 133.  It was established in the court’s opinion that by the time officers
Migliaro and Collegio arrived to Anthony’s apartment, other police units were already
present and had verified that no assault, as reported, had taken place.
647
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648 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
who sounded incoherent and possibly emotionally disturbed.5  The
caller alleged that she was five-years-old, and that her husband beat
on her, and had a knife and a gun.6  When Officers Migliaro and
Collegio arrived at the apartment, Anthony, a 34-year-old immi-
grant female, was home alone.7  Although she was diagnosed with
Down Syndrome and had mild hearing loss, Anthony was capable
of cooking, cleaning, and caring for herself.8  After ascertaining
that no assault as reported had occurred, the officers tried to ques-
tion Anthony, who was calmly seated on a chair, and did not speak
to any of the officers or explain why a 911 call was made.9 Accord-
ing to officer Migliaro, Anthony “appeared to be slow.”  With the
help of a neighbor, the police attempted to contact co-plaintiff,
Magdalene Wright, who was Anthony’s legal guardian.10  However,
after six failed attempts to contact Wright, the two officers, at the
instruction of a supervisor, handcuffed Anthony11 and took her to
Kings County Hospital for psychiatric evaluation.12  This occurred
even though Anthony was capable of caring for herself13 and
showed no indicia of mental illness, other than a refusal to answer
police questions and possibly placing a 911 call inappropriately.14
The officers left a note for Wright letting her know that Anthony
was taken to the hospital.15  After one day of evaluation, Anthony
was released from the hospital.16
Wright and Anthony sued Migliaro and Collegio individually17
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes liability upon government
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 131.
8. Id. at 132.
9. Anthony, 339 F.3d. at 133.  Testimony from Officer Collegio stated that
Anthony was “running about”, “crying” and “screaming” and that he felt threatened by
her.  In reviewing the lower court’s ruling on defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment, the appellate court accepted Migliaro’s testimony as the facts most favorable to
the plaintiff.
10. Id. at 132 .
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. .
14. Id. at 133.
15. Anthony 339 F.3d at134.
16. Id.
17. Anthony v. City of New York, No. 00 Civ. 4688, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8923
(S.D.N.Y. July 2001). Anthony also sued the City of New York, the Health & Hospitals
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2004] ANTHONY V. CITY OF NEW YORK 649
officials who “under the color of any statute. . .subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction. . .to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and its laws.”18  The pur-
pose of the statute is to deter government officials from abusing
their authority and to provide a remedy, where deterrence fails, for
individuals who are victims of such abuse.19  Anthony claimed that
the officers, while operating “under the color of law,” violated her
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches or
seizures.20
The Southern District Court of New York held that the officers’
seizure of Anthony was permissible because they had probable
cause to believe that Anthony would be “a danger to herself or to
others.”21  The District Court based its decision on the fact that
Anthony had Down Syndrome and allegedly placed a 911 call de-
tailing an assault against her by her husband.22  The court found it
reasonable for the officers to believe that “if left alone, [Anthony
would] conduct herself in a manner likely to result in serious harm
to herself.”23  Relying on a holding from Monday v. Oullette,24 the
district court in Anthony held that the officers’ decision to seize
Anthony was reasonable even though she appeared calm.25  The
Corp. of New York, and the officers individually and in their official capacity for violat-
ing the American with Disabilities Acts and various state tort law causes of action.
Wright also brought a Fourth Amendment claim pertaining to the warrantless entry
into her apartment.  Only Anthony’s Fourth Amendment violation claim pertaining to
her personal seizure is considered in this case comment.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003).
19. Heather Carey, Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury: The Fourth Amendment’s Protection of
Liberty and Privacy Versus Qualified Immunity, 21 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 513 (1999) citing
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
20. Anthony 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8923.).
21. Id. at *17.
22. Anthony, 339 F.3d at 137 n.2.  It was definitely ascertained that the call was
placed from Anthony’s apartment.  There is no evidence cited in the case that Anthony
herself placed the call.
23. Anthony, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8923, at *17.
24. Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099 (6th Cir. 1997).  The court in Monday held
that even where plaintiff appeared coherent and denied attempting to commit suicide,
there was an unreasonable risk that plaintiff was deceiving officers and so the officers’
had probable cause to seize plaintiff. Anthony v. City of New York, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis
8923, *18.
25. Anthony, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8923, at *20.
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650 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
District Court also ruled that even if the officers had violated
Anthony’s constitutional rights, they would be entitled to qualified
immunity from liability because of Anthony’s statements in the 911
call and “the officers’ observation of Anthony.”26
The grant of qualified immunity is given to insulate govern-
ment officials from liability for carrying out their discretionary func-
tions.27  The goal of the immunity is to alleviate the fear of frivolous
civil law-suits for every discretionary function performed by a gov-
ernment official.28  However, the grant of immunity is qualified,
rather than absolute, so as to prevent a gross abuse of governmental
powers.29  Whether an official may be held personally liable for an
allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the “objective
legal reasonableness” of the action, assessed in light of the legal
rules that were “clearly established” at the time the action was
taken.30  Thus, if an officer knew or reasonably should have known,
that at the time he was arresting a person, the officer was violating
that person’s right – for example, failing to read the perpetrator
her Miranda warnings31 – the officer would not qualify for immu-
nity for the violation because that right is clearly established by law
and by practice.  The police officer presumably could not argue
that he did not know of the existence of that right since it is com-
mon and mandatory in all police training.32  Neither could the of-
ficer argue that he believed his actions were objectively reasonable
given the fact that no other reasonable officer would or could have
assumed the same.  As it pertains to seizure of a person, a police
officer is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds if he can establish as a matter of law that a reasonable of-
26. Id.
27. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
28. Id.
29. Carey, supra note 20.
30. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
31. Miranda warnings are the standard rights that every arresting police officer in
the U.S. must read to arrestees upon apprehension in order to preserve the individuals
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).”
32. Id.
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2004] ANTHONY V. CITY OF NEW YORK 651
ficer could have believed that [his conduct] comported with the
Fourth Amendment even though it actually did not.33
Anthony and Wright appealed the District Court’s decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which
affirmed the lower court’s ruling.  In her decision for the Second
Circuit, Judge Sotomayer declined to determine whether or not the
two officers had probable cause to seize Anthony under the Fourth
Amendment.  Rather, the court simply upheld the lower court deci-
sion, that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from any
Fourth Amendment violation.34  Citing the case of Lennon v.
Miller35to justify its holding, the court stated:
We have explained that ‘even where the plaintiff’s federal
rights and the scope of the official’s permissible conduct
are clearly established, the qualified immunity defense
protects a government actor if it was “objectively reasona-
ble’ for him to believe that his actions were lawful at the
time of the challenged act.”36
Referencing nothing more than the “circumstances of which [the
officers] were aware from. . .the 911 dispatch,”37 their personal ob-
servations inside the apartment, and their response to the com-
mand of a superior officer, the court found that the officers’
actions were objectively reasonable.38
By summarily granting the police officers qualified immunity
without considering the merits of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment vi-
olation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court broadened the dis-
cretion of the police to seize people with slight mental retardation
or diminished reasoning capacity without a clear definition of what
constitutes probable cause under such circumstances.  Since the en-
33. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 635. See also, Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416 (2d  Cir.
1995), where the court granted a qualified immunity to a police officer who unlawfully
arrested plaintiff under the belief that plaintiff was interfering with a governmental
administration.  The court held it was reasonable for the officer to believe that plain-
tiff’s refusal to comply with police orders constituted obstruction of governmental ad-
ministration even though the officer was not performing a government function at the
time of the arrest.
34. Anthony, 339 at 137.
35. Lennon , 66 F.3d at 420.
36. Anthony, 339 F.3d at 137 (citing Lennon, 66 F.3d at 420 ).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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652 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
titlement of qualified immunity depends on what an officer be-
lieved to be a lawful act39 (i.e. seizing a person under probable
cause) absent a clear definition of what constitutes probable cause
for seizing a potentially mentally ill person, an officer’s discretion
to seize such a person will continue to be protected regardless of
whether the person is really in need of psychiatric evaluation.
Under this ruling, police officers may continue to forcibly seize any
person perceived to be mentally ill with impunity because qualified
immunity will always be granted where the officer’s actions did not
violate a clearly established right of a person40 or if an officer’s ac-
tions were deemed objectionably reasonable under the circum-
stances.41  The absence of a bright line rule supporting probable
cause to seize a potentially mentally ill person will ensure that there
is no clearly established right to be violated when seizing mentally
facile or even some elderly citizens.  In cases involving potentially
mentally ill patients, a requirement that there be some type of out-
ward manifestation indicative of a person’s need for psychiatric
evaluation should be the basis for determining probable cause.
Some courts have implicitly adopted this standard for an out-
ward manifestation supporting probable cause without stating it as
a rule of law.42  In the case of Monday v. Oullette,43 which the court
relies on to sustain the officers’ basis for seizing Anthony, the case
references a number of examples in which officers were deemed to
have probable cause for their seizure.44  In Sherman, the court said
that “probable cause supported the involuntary commitment given
plaintiff’s multiple threats against others and odd public behav-
ior.”45  In Harris, the court granted qualified immunity to an officer
who detained plaintiff for emergency valuation because the plain-
tiff became angry when questioned and plaintiff showed officer a
39. Carey, supra note 20.
40. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 635
41. Id.
42. See, Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1103 (6th Cir. 1997). See also, People
v. Hodge, 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 20222 (4th Dept. Dec. 31, 2003); Bailey v. Kennedy, 349
F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2003); S.P. v. City of Tokoman Park, Md, 950 F. Supp. 705 (M.D.,
1997); Rzayeva v. Foster, 134 F. Supp. 2d 239 (C.T., 2001).
43. Monday, 118 F.3d at 1103.
44. Sherman v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1993); Harris
v. Pirch, 677 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1982); and Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1993).
45. Sherman, 987 F.2d at 397.
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2004] ANTHONY V. CITY OF NEW YORK 653
partially empty bottle of pills.46  In Glass, the court granted quali-
fied immunity to government health administrators who involunta-
rily committed a patient accused of threatening other patients with
a gun.  The court cited plaintiff’s history of violent and hostile be-
havior as a sufficient basis for finding that probable cause existed to
seize plaintiff.47  In each case, the person seized had an outward
physical and/or verbal manifestation which the court found to be a
sufficient basis supporting the seizure.
In Monday v. Oullette, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit held that officer John Oulette (“Oulette”) was en-
titled to qualified immunity for the seizure of plaintiff, Daryl Mon-
day (“Monday”), where Oulette believed that Monday had
overdosed on some prescription pills while intoxicated.48  Monday
was undergoing a divorce and had a history of alcohol and drug
abuse.49  At the time of his seizure, the officers knew that he would
more likely than not attempt to commit suicide based on a discus-
sion with Monday’s psychiatrist and a half empty bottle of prescrip-
tion drugs.50  When the officers insisted that he go with them to the
hospital, Monday verbally refused to go with the police officers and
sat down to drink another beer.51  Under those circumstances,
there was a known danger and a very probable risk that Monday
would cause injury to himself.  In Anthony, however, there is no
statement by Anthony upon which the police rely to make their as-
sessment to seize her.  One of the key distinctions between Monday
and Anthony is the presence of physical evidence, i.e., the half-
empty prescription bottle that further supports the officers’ reason-
able basis for seizing Monday.  The court in Anthony alludes to no
evidentiary support other than the vague references to “the officers’
“personal observations” at the time.52  If the officers had observed
Anthony to be volatile and excitable at the time they arrived, there
would have been a clearer “objectively reasonable” basis to seize
Anthony under the probable cause standard.  However, Anthony
46. Harris, 677 F.2d at 681.
47. Glass, 984 F.2d at 55.
48. Monday, 118 F.3d at 1101.
49. Id. at 1100.
50. Id. at 1103.
51. Id.
52. Anthony, 339 F.3d at 138.
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654 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
sat calmly on the chair refusing to answer questions.  The require-
ment of an outward manifestation that a person may pose a danger
to herself or others would have enabled the court to find that no
objectively reasonable basis existed to justify Anthony’s seizure.
The court’s reliance on Monday v. Oullette and its internal case ref-
erences, underscores the argument that there should be an out-
ward manifestation such as words or actions to provide a probable
cause for the seizure.
Although there are circumstances under which a person would
welcome the intrusion of law enforcement into the privacy of his or
her own home – e.g., in the case of an assault in progress – the
fundamental expectation is that where no such danger exists in
one’s home, the government should not intrude.53  An extension of
that principle would be that where such dangers do exist in one’s
home, the expectation would be that the government would remain
only as long as is necessary to ensure that the danger ceases.54  Any
overstepping of that boundary tramples upon the fundamental
guarantee of the U.S. Constitution against unreasonable search or
seizure.  The imposition of a bright-line rule regarding when a po-
tentially mentally ill person should be seized would remove the sub-
jectivity behind the officer’s determination for seizure of an
individual that may or may not warrant a psychiatric evaluation.55
This outward manifestation standard would adequately protect the
53. There is a general expectation of privacy recognized by the Fourth Amend-
ment where, absent exigent circumstances, the police must obtain a warrant before
entering a home or conducting a search of person or place.
54. See, e.g. Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (C.A. Cal 1962) (“. . .the only legitimate
purpose of a search is to ascertain whether articles which the officers have a right to
seize are on the person or premises being searched. Any search is unauthorized and so
becomes unreasonable in the constitutional sense when it goes beyond that purpose.”);
see, also United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that where “no
actual ongoing threat” existed, police officers erred in warrantless search and seizure
even though witnesses reported gunfire by defendant).
55. Interestingly enough, under Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41, in July 2004, New
York State will now require that a person must “appear to be mentally ill and is con-
ducting himself in a manner. . .likely to result in serious harm to himself or others”
before a police officer can make an emergency admission for immediate observation
and treatment.  Likelihood of serious harm is defined as “a substantial risk of physical
harm to himself as manifested by threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm
or other conduct demonstrating that he is dangerous to himself” or homicidal or violent
behavior which causes others to have a reasonable fear of serious physical harm.  (em-
phasis added).
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officer from unnecessary liability for errors in his judgment while
upholding the right of even the mentally disabled to be free from
unwarranted government seizure.  In circumstances involving the
forcible seizure of a person for the purpose of a psychiatric evalua-
tion an objective basis for determining a person’s danger to herself
or to others must be established before a court can grant qualified
immunity.  As stated by one law review author, “when courts . . .
grant qualified immunity without first wrestling with difficult
Fourth Amendment issues, the line between constitutional and un-
constitutional searches and seizures remains unclear.”56
56. Carey, supra note 20, at 518.
